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Mari asked:

Could you explain one version of the cosmological argument and one possible objection to it?

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One version of the Cosmological argument (based on Leibniz's version) starts from the contingent
fact that the world exists. After all the world did not have to exist, there could easily have been
nothingness instead of the something that we experience today. So we can ask why there .is
something rather than nothing.

To begin the argument we need to see that whatever does exist in the world depends on something
else — the reason why X exists is dependent on the existence of Y. But this itself is contingent Y did
not have to exist, and so Y is dependent on something else Z. So the world as a whole set of thing (X,
Y, Z) only exists contingently and so may not have existed.

The reason why the world exists then must be due to something outside the contingencies of the
world, a thing that contains its own reason for existing i.e. a necessary reason. Such a necessary
reason is taken to be God.

The major objection to such an argument is to do with the idea of a necessary being. Is the idea of
necessary existing being coherent or even plausible? and if so why should God be such a being?
Hume for example thought that matter was just as likely a candidate for existing necessarily.

Kant claimed that the cosmological argument rested upon the Ontological proof and since he thought
that the ontological tails so too does the cosmological argument. Another problem is how does idea of
a necessary being help us answer the question why there is something rather than nothing. God may
be the reason for his own existence, but he could still have chosen not to create the universe. So we
need more premises about the nature of God (that He would want to create the world, that He is able
to create the world for example). Something the cosmological argument on its own does not provide.

Brian Tee
Dept of Philosophy
University of Sheffield

St. Thomas Aquinas famously gave five ways to prove the existence of God, of which the first three
are forms of the cosmological argument. It is however the third form, and variations on it that are
nowadays known asthecosmological argument. It is also known as the argument from contingency.

The argument starts from the assumption that all things in the universe are contingent, which is to say
that they need not have existed, or have existed in the way that they do. This is true, and can been
seen by considering the fact that all things at one time did not exist, and depended for there existence
on other things. My computer exists thanks to the computer shop putting it together, who had the
parts thanks to the manufacturer, who made them from materials from someone else, etc. etc.
Everything points beyond itself to other things. Someone might copy this for an essay, and i might
have copied it from a book, and the author might have copied it from someone else. But this chain
must have an end. It is impossible that the essay came from nowhere: at the end of the chain there
must be someone who didn't copy from anyone else, who wrote it. The argument is that in order for
there to be a contingent world, there also needs to be a non contingent foundation, something that
does not depend on anything else for its existence. Without this, there would be an infinite regress.
The non-contingent grounding, or 'necessary being' is what we call God.

There are different ways of objecting to the argument: one way would be to question the notion of
causality that is used. For example, Hume argued that causal connections are just observed
sequences, and that we have no justification for the belief that all events must have a cause.
Although this objection may well be valid, it seems a little to 'philosophical', a little far fetched. A much
simpler tack is possible: we can accept that the argument is valid, yet still reject the conclusion that
God exists.

The conclusion of the argument is presented as a dilemma: either God exists or the universe is
ultimately unintelligible. The problem is that there is no reason for us to reject the second horn. That
the universe is ultimately unintelligible is precisely the sceptic's position. The cosmological argument
can be seen as simply demonstrating the logical implications of an intelligible universe, i.e. if the
universe has an ultimate meaning, then there must be a God. But the reasons that would lead one to
reject the idea that the universe has a meaning are precisely the reasons that would lead one to
reject that there is a God. We are asked to assume from the start that there is a foundation and
meaning to the universe, but this is tantamount to asking us to assume that there is a God. The
cosmological argument does not operate as a proof to the sceptic, and the sceptic is the only one
who asks for a proof. It would seem that the cosmological argument is no more than philosophical
preaching to the converted.

Will Greenwood