Llinos asked:

Is logical determinism merely a form of empty fatalism? Please could you comment...I'm stuck!

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The thesis of determinism - the thesis that every event has a determining cause- is usually held to be
an empirical, not a logical question. I assume, therefore, that what you mean by 'logical determinism'
is a quite different claim, concerning the nature of truth.The claim in question is that a statement
possesses the value 'true' or the value 'false', irrespective of the time reference. If I assert, 'Labour
will win the next General Election', my assertion has a truth value now, even though I cannot know
what the value is. In a logical sense, it seems that the outcome of the next General Election is already
decided. The Labour victory, or, alternatively, the Labour defeat, is a fact that exists now about the
future, which we will discover - to our delight or otherwise, depending on our political affiliations -
when the time comes.

The thesis I have just described is known as 'fatalism'.

In common speech, fatalism, or being fatalistic implies that the future will be what it will be, and
therefore that nothing can be done about it. There is a fallacious argument that goes: 'Either it is true
that I shall pass the exam, or it is false. If it is true that I shall pass, then I shall pass even if I don't
study. If it is false that I shall pass, then I shall not pass, despite my very best efforts. Therefore there
is no point in attempting to study for the exam.' Philosophical fatalism is emptybecause, unlike the
fallacious argument I have just given, it is not meant to entail practical consequences. If the truth
about whether I will pass or not is outside my control, then so for the very same reason is the truth
about whether I will study or not. From this perspective, all action appears equally impossible.

- If the argument about the exam is fallacious, where exactly is the fallacy? Perhaps that is something
you would like to think about!

Geoffrey Klempner