Philo
Sophos
·com

philosophy is for everyone
and not just philosophers

philosophers should know lots
of things besides philosophy


PhiloSophos knowledge base

Philosophical Connections

Pathways to Philosophy programs

Pathways web sites

Philosophy lovers gallery

Science, arts and humanities

PhiloSophos home

home first back 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 forward

Peto asked:

In your opinion is it necessary that soul should be aparted from body?

============

Let us look at the reasons that might be given why the soul must be necessarily 'aparted' or
separated from body.

In the MeditationsDescartes argued that it is possible that I could have all the subjective experiences
I am having now, even though an external world of material objects in space does not exist. For it is
conceivable that all my subjective experiences are being produced in me by an evil demon who wants
to deceive me into thinking that a material world in space exists when it doesn't.

Descartes used this sceptical hypothesis to raise the question of how we can prove anything about
the external world. But in the 'Sixth Meditation' he also made a further deduction. He said that if it is
conceivable that my subjective experiences can exist even though my body does not exist, then even
if my body doesexist - even if there is no evil demon but a God who is not a deceiver - then my
subjective experiences cannot belong to anything material but must belong to something
non-material. In other words, my experiences occur in a non-material soul which is necessarily
separate from my body.

What Descartes is saying is that if there are two things, A and B that can be conceived of as existing
apart, then they can never be called the 'same thing', even though we never find them apart in the
actual world. If my experiences can be conceived of as existing apart from my body or my brain, then
experiences can never be the 'same thing' as brain processes, even though in the actual world
experiences never occur without brain processes.

What is interesting about this argument is that it does not rely on alleged cases of reincarnation, or
out-of-body experiences. It is based on purely logical considerations. But is it valid?

To answer that question would require a long essay. I believe that Descartes' argument does present
a serious challenge to materialism. The materialist has got to prove, not only that materialism is true
in the actual world, but also that materialism is true in all possible worlds. For if we grant just one
possible world where materialism is not true, i.e. a possible world where subjective experiences occur
in the absence of any physical processes, then any subject which has those kinds of experiences in
the actual world must be regarded as 'necessarily separated from body'.

You asked for my opinion. In my view, materialism can be defended against Descartes' argument.
However, the debate does not stop there. According to materialism, a possible world exactly like this
one with someone exactly like me in it would necessarily be a possible world in which I myself
existed. Yet it does seem that I can conceive that things might have been just the way they are, that
there might have been a Dr Klempner writing these words to you now, even though Idid not exist. I
have not yet come across a satisfactory reply to that argument. But I am also not sure what
conclusions, if any, can be deduced from it.

Geoffrey Klempner