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Tataiat asked:
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What is the difference between " Epoche" and "Reduction" in Husserl's Phenomenology?
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============
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Yes, this can be confusing at first. I don't want to go into the whole background here... for a nice
introduction you can look through: Ihde, D. (1977). Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction.
New York, NY, G. P. Putnam's Sons. Take a look at my answers to Trent also. I'm just going to skim
through this rather complex issue very quickly.
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But basically they are two very different things. The epoche is the first step in getting around the
Cartesian doubt: what can we be certain of, and why can't we have certainty about the world. Husserl
sort of cuts the Gordian knot here by simply having one suspend belief in the world and, in that
mind-set, looking at allexperiences as leveled, so to speak, on that dimension. So there is no
"privileging" of "real-world" experiences; everything is equal, and we don't even bring Cartesian doubt
into the picture.
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But we still want certainty, and there's the problem of particulars, for one thing: things keep changing.
So how do we get to apodictic, absolute thingies, "essences"? Well, we go through the second step,
the reduction. This consists of varyingwhat we experience (read Ihde on the techniques here), and
"extracting", so to speak, the essence, the unchanging core (or, from another point of view,
apprehending the essence which spontaneously appears,as a result of "abstraction" — of some sort;
Husserl is totally unclear on this — from the particulars).
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And so we have, first, eliminated the question of the world vs. the "mental" with the epoche, and
second, found, in allour experiences, those which are essential, certain, apprehended without doubt:
apodictic. You see? The end, problem solved. Haha, according to Husserl, anyway. As you might
expect there are just a few people who have problems with all this, including me. But until you can
wade through some of the Logical Investigations and the Ideen, you simply do not have the
background to read the critiques of Husserl.
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Steven Ravett Brown
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