Sarah asked:

What does Strawson [in "Freedom and Resentment"] say about moral responsibility, and the claim
that] no one is ever morally responsible for anything they do?

============

The "compatibilist" answer to the question of whether humans have free will or not is that all the
freedom we need have in order to be said to have free will is the freedom to do as we choose to do —
that is, freedom from external constraints. In order for you to be choosing to do as you desire, you
have to be acting consistently, in accordance with your character. If your character, and therefore
your choices, are ultimately the result of a causal chain stretching back through your desires and
values to your past experience and genetic inheritance, so be it. Determinism of that kind is
compatible with autonomy.

The problem is: if you neither create not control your character, why should you be blamed and
punished for your actions? Strawson's position is that holding people responsible for their actions fits
within a framework of attitudes that make possible our rich social existence and personal
relationships. These include "reactive attitudes" such as resentment, as well as those more central to
responsibility, such as praise and blame. They are natural, interactive and integral to our form of life.
To hold people responsible for their actions is to accept them as full participants in this form of life.
We can suspend our reactions when we excuse behaviour for some reason, or when we judge that it
has the wrong kind of cause and an "objective stance" is more appropriate. In some cases we may
see the person more as a patient than as a responsible agent — as being, temporarily, outside the
moral frame.

Strawson argues that previous positions have "over-intellectualised" moral responsibility by
suggesting that we ascribe it on the basis of a judgement that a theoretical or pragmatic condition
(such as metaphysical freedom or social efficacy) has been satisfied. Rather, to hold someone
responsible is to react to them as full participants at that moment in the moral community. The
"threat" from causal determinism is irrelevant because being seen as someone to whom we can react
personally is not dependent on your possession of autonomy or the capacity to self-create. To
question the rationality of moral responsibility in the context of the truth of causal determinism is to
overlook this point, and how deeply embedded in our way of life the associated attitudes are. I think
Strawson also hints at the irrationality of giving up such a source of enrichment.

Three questions about Strawson's argument. 1. He maintains that we cannot criticise the reactive
attitudes from a position within the framework: does he exaggerate the interdependence of the
various attitudes? 2. What is it exactly that actually qualifies us for membership of the moral
community and for the accolade of "person"? 3. Is determinism really irrelevant to the concept of
responsibility, and would accepting its truth necessarily necessitate a universal adoption of the
objective stance?

Graham Nutbrown