Dianne asked:

I am very stuck on writing a paper on Taylor's argument for fatalism in "The Story of Osmo" (from his
book Metaphysics) and focusing on showing how his conclusion is not necessarily true just because
of one specific premise. (I focused on the large parts of his argument in my draft, and it was
suggested that I try to uncover the smaller parts on which these larger parts are ungrounded).

I was thinking therefore of just focusing on denying his premiss that the future is fixed, arguing that
just because the past is unavoidable doesn't mean that the future is as well, but I am stuck because I
don't have enough to say about that one point for a 4—6 page essay and was wondering if you had
any suggestions. Perhaps I should focus on another premise, but that seems to be the most faulty in
terms of the argument as I have it laid out, I just can't pinpoint the faulty assumptions that themselves
LEAD to that premise (because it seems like Taylor just jumps to that conclusion simply from the fact
that the past is unchangeable).

It was suggested that I re-examine Taylor's arguments, "those which are implicit and those which he
doesn't state but might usefully make his position more forceful", but I don't really know how to go
about doing so. I outlined the argument as I see it below (I ignored the story of Osmo itself because I
took it to be irrelevant since it is, after all, a story; instead, I focused on Taylor's proceeding argument
on why he and we should be fatalists, but perhaps Osmo's story is in fact important to bring up):

1) God Exists and is Omniscient (which implies foreknowledge).

2) Thus, there exists a set of true statements about each of our lives, both past and future.

3) Thus, we must have not only one possible past, but also only one possible future (just like the past,
"whatever the future holds there is nothing we can do about it now")

4) Therefore, we are fated (and so fatalism is justified).

Sorry for being so "rambly" but I was just trying to throw out all the little things that have been
confusing me and also explain what I've done so far. Any help you could provide would be very very
much appreciated.

============

It has been a while since I have had the opportunity to read Taylor's argument for fatalism and the
story of Osmo, but it seems to me that judging by the way you have presented Taylor's argument, the
primary premise to attack is the first, which includes 3 powerful assumptions that can quite easily be
challenged.

The first assumption of the premise is that God exists. While it is often a presupposition that gets the
least treatment due to the almost difficult task of its proof, or lack thereof. It nevertheless is the
easiest attack to place against Taylor's argument in this case Although Taylor can respond with a
"weaker" version of God, or some Creator entity, he would need to build a separate case for that
entity's existence and foreknowledge.

The second assumption of the premise is that God is omniscient. Often when the existence of God is
argued, the "God" argued for is an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent creator being. This
can certainly be challenged even if the existence of God, or other Creator entity, is presupposed,
and/or successfully argued for. Specifically, a look at suffering, or the problem of evil can call in to
question several, if not all of the "O"s typically ascribed to God.

The third assumption of the premise, is that God's omniscience implies foreknowledge. It is here that I
believe the most interesting attack may be made. It is often the case that people assume that
omniscience includes knowledge of events that are to occur in the future, this indeed is what the story
of Osmo is predicated on, that somehow, future events are knowable before the events occur (thus
Osmo was able to find the book describing future events in his life). However, there is no need for
omniscience to include foreknowledge. An omniscient being need only know all things that are
knowable, but what would make us believe that future events are knowable?

Past events are knowable, they have occurred, and one may form a true, justified, and warranted
belief as to such, but if future events have no truth value until the event has occurred, then one
cannot have knowledge about those events (assuming knowledge implies truth). Thus, omniscience
need not imply foreknowledge.

Brian Heva