What is a "psychological problem"? I assume Reg does not mean a troubled state of mind that
requires therapy. If he means a problem pertaining to a scientific theory of mind, then I suppose one
can argue that any such theory must rest on a philosophical theory of how mind and body relate. For
well over a century now, psychology has been an independent field of empirical inquiry, not merely a
subdivision of philosophy. Each intellectual framework within which psychologists interpret the
empirical data of their case studies, however, each school of psychological thought, presupposes an
implicit philosophical understanding of the mind-body relationship. Psychologists as such will not
explicitly verify or falsify one or another such understanding. That remains a lively field of
investigation for philosophers.
A fascinating question. I don't actually think that it can be answered in any simple, yes/no fashion.
There are aspects of that problem, for example, involving the ontological status of qualia, which are
philosophical. Other aspects, concerning questions involving specific relationships between mind and
body, such as where in the brain we process visual information and how we do that, are
If the "mind-body problem" is taken to be, simply, the elucidation of the relationships between mind
and body, and "mind" is taken to mean "experienced phenomena" (a rather narrow definition), and
"body" is taken to mean something like "the objects which realize mind" (a rather question-begging
definition in this context), then at this point in time there is still no clear answer. The problem there is
that it is not clear what, if any, the boundary or differentiator between experiences and objects is. Do
objects have color, or do they merely reflect radiation, for which we, as we sense that radiation and
process those sensations, create and assign the color? Does a hammer, to take Heidegger's
example, as an object, somehow realize or embody its purpose, or does that realization necessitate
the participation of acculturated humans, and if so, is that purpose any less "objective" for that
necessity than, say, its shape (which, in order to be described, at least, requires the same)?