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Andrew asked:

What are the differences and similarities between Value judgement and factual judgement?

============

There is an excellent chapter on value judgements in "Learning to Philosophize" by E.R. Emmet, but I
think it might be out of print, so I will give you a summary:

Factual Judgement

I have in front of me two mini-skirts, and I say that this one is longer than that one. It would be
generally agreed that whether this is true or not is a matter of fact. It can be decided by putting them
beside one another — assuming the difference is obvious to the naked eye. As long as everyone
understands what 'longer than' means,we will all agree. If the difference was not visible to the naked
eye, and had to be decided by accurate measuring, everyone would still accept that it is a matter of
fact which one is longer. A factual statement is able to be publicly tested, can be verified or falsified
by experience. It is often called objective.

Value Judgement

In the furniture store, I try lying on two futons, and I say, "This futon is less comfortable than that one."
I am saying that I personally find one futon less comfortable than the other, with perhaps also the
assumption that most people will agree with me. Statements such as this, which express or describe
the attitude of the speaker, are often called subjective.

Many kinds of judgement lie between these two clear-cut extremes, and it can then be difficult to
decide whether they should be regarded as matters of fact or matters of taste. They include many
instances where we mark or rate something in comparison to something else, or say that something
is better than something else. Emmet gives the example of a teacher marking essays — we want to
say it is more than just a matter of opinion what grades they are given, but it has an element of
subjectivity too.

Consider this question posed by Emmet in the book:

"
Consider and discuss the criteria you would use if you had to judge the following contests. To what
extent would they be matters of fact, and to what extent matters of taste? Would you be likely to have
to compare the amount by which A was better than B in one respect with the amount by which B was
better than A in another?

i. A Drill Competition

ii. A Flower Show

iii. A Music Competition

iv. A Beauty Contest"

Katharine Hunt

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