Steven asked:

If God created logic, is a rational understanding of God possible?

The riddle "can an omnipotent God create a rock so big he can't lift it" implies that there is some type
of contradiction in the concept of an omnipotent being. However, as the creator of logic, God would
not be bound by logic. If God can transcend logic, then the contradiction above evaporates.

Is it possible to draw conclusions about a God that can transcend logic? For example, if assertions
from religious scriptures about God are used as premises, would conclusions drawn from these
premises be meaningful? Is it possible to form a valid logical argument relating to God if God can
transcend logic?

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If God created logic, then there was no logic before that creation, which therefore could not itself have
conformed to the principle of contradiction. If God created logic, then the pre-logic God was
absolutely incoherent and chaotic (in which case, why should we trust that inference?). If God created
logic, then God would not be "bound by logic" but rather in bondage to illogic, which is how
"transcends logic" sounds to my ears. Why speculate as to whether a "rational" understanding of such
a God would be "possible"? What would "possible" mean here, anyway? Logically possible? What is
logical possibility in a world in which logic is "created"?

Also, there is no such thing as theconcept of an omnipotent being: some concepts of "omnipotent
being" are internally consistent, some inconsistent. Resorting to the notion of a God who transcends
logic is a high price to pay to solve a riddle. Why not just modify the notion? "If God can transcend
logic, then the contradiction above evaporates" — and so does "If . . . then . . ." (Why would we want
contradictions to evaporate? Because we're "wired" to?)

Charles Hartshorne suggested, persuasively in my opinion, that logic and metaphysics ultimately do
not differ. The principle that denies meaning to a contradiction is a principle of reality, not just of how
our minds are structured. What he had to say bears directly on the theistic issue that Steven raised.
Thanks in advance for indulging me:

"[W]e may divide knowledge as follows: mathematics, dealing with various 'possible worlds,' or better,
various possiblelogical structures; natural and social science dealing with the one actual world;
metaphysics, dealing with what is common and necessaryto all possible states of affairs and all
possible truths, including adjudication of the question whether 'there is no world at all' represents a
conceivable truth or is mere nonsense or contradiction. Now God is conceived as the actual creator of
the actual world and the potential creator of possible worlds . . .; hence divinity is not a mere fact or
fiction of the actual world, but is either nonsense, in relation to all possible states of affairs, or a
necessary reality, in the same relation, that is, the idea is metaphysical...

"Whether and how we can distinguish between metaphysics and logic is more difficult to say. I am not
sure that they do differ. It seems easy to show that logicians today disagree on what are plainly
metaphysical questions (referring to what is common to all possibility): such as, Is all truth eternal? Is
there an a priori principle of causal connectedness? Is 'some world exists' true not merely in fact, but
necessarily, or in any possible case? In this book I am trying to set forth the logic of basic theological
concepts; but perhaps these are the same as the theistic implications of basic logical concepts. If only
a few logicians could be induced to look into the matter! On one point, at least, I believe metaphysics
can agree with contemporary logic: metaphysical truths, if valid, must, since they are to be necessary,
be 'analytic,' if that means, 'certified by meaning alone.' I am confident that the theistic question will
be rationally settled when .. . it becomes really clear to educated persons what are the possible
consistent meanings . . . of 'supreme being,' 'absolute,' 'perfect,' 'necessary being,' and the like. To
hasten that time is the main object of this study" (Charles Hartshorne The Divine Relativity (1948).

Tony Flood

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