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Alison asked:

Should people be allowed to gamble?

============

An interesting question which I see as a specific example of a more general question — whether
paternalism is justified. By paternalism I mean the idea that those in authority are justified in
forbidding those under them from doing some action that will harm the 'underlings' themselves (or
requiring they do something that will do them good). The word arises from 'pater' = father: we can see
that it is the sort of thing fathers (and mothers of course) do to their children.

People seek to justify paternalism on the grounds that it is good for the 'underling'. Others say it is not
justified because it contravenes the underling's autonomy — their right to choose for themselves,
even if it potentially leads to self harm.

We clearly allow that paternalism is justified in some cases. Nobody seriously argues that a father
should allow his child to choose to stick a knife in a power point. In other cases we clearly disallow it.
Few would seriously argue that a government may ban adults from rock climbing or football —
activities which demonstrably have a potential for harm.

So your question boils down to this: is gambling more like power-point-knife-sticking, or more like
football? Is the potential for harm great enough, and the ability of the gamblers to choose wisely weak
enough, to justify paternalism?

Tim Sprod