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Lindsey asked:
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Can you tell me what Amoralism, Subjectivism, and Relativism all have in common? What similar
relationship/ characteristic do they all share in their claims? And what is the flaw in their similar
claims?
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============
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One thing that amoralism, subjectivism and relativism have in common is the denial of the objectivity
of moral value. The amoralist thinks morality is something you are into or not, the subjectivist takes
morality as a matter of personal sentiment and the relativist takes morality as culturally valid but not
objective or universal. These moral attitudes arise in part from the problematic position of moral
objectivity in its attempt to establish moral truth or a moral reality which transcends ordinary fact.
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However, it is not clear cut. A weak relativist might admit that while values are cultural in fact, there is
a possibility of agreement if cultural differences can be settled in some way. However, this person
would not strictly be a relativist if he thought that there was the possibility of ultimate agreement on
moral value amongst humanity in general. On the other hand, if a relativist is not simply a subjectivist,
he must recognise the claims of culture which is a move towards, not objectivity, but at least
intersubjectivity.
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It is moral objectivity — or intersubjectivity — which the three positions do not recognise. The three
positions fail to acknowledge the reality of our recognition of the value others as actually having
importance in our deliberations towards action, or as just mattering because we care about them. The
flaw is that the three positions are not moral positions at all. Rather, they deny the actuality of morality
or reduce morality to sentiment or cultural codes.
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Rachel Browne
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